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Abstract
We present suﬃcient conditions for monotone matching in environ-
ments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These
conditions involve complementarity in types not only of the total pay-
oﬀ to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also in the degree
of transferability between partners. We apply our conditions to study
some models of risk sharing and incentive problems.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
For the economist analyzing household behavior, ﬁrm formation, or the labor
market, the characteristics of matched partners are paramount. The educa-
tional background of men and women who are married, the ﬁnancial positions
of ﬁrms that are merging, or the productivities of agents who are working
together, all matter for understanding their respective markets. Matching
patterns serve as direct evidence for theory, ﬁgure in the econometrics of
selection eﬀects, facilitate theoretical analysis, and are even treated as policy
variables.
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1Much is known about characterizing matching in the special case of trans-
ferable utility (TU). For instance, if the function representing the total payoﬀ
to the match satisﬁes increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in the partners’ at-
tributes, then there will always be positive (negative) assortative matching,
whatever the distribution of types. Because they are distribution-free, results
of this sort are very powerful and easy to apply.
For an individual contemplating marriage, a ﬁrm entering into a joint
venture, or a ﬁlm producer seeking a director, the partners’ characteristics
are also crucial, for two equally important and possibly conﬂicting reasons:
they determine the gains from the relationship, and they aﬀect the ability to
share in them. A star director might make for a proﬁtable collaboration, but
if stars are cagey or obstinate, it will be too costly or unpleasant to keep the
ﬁlm under budget, and the producer might go for someone less well-known
or talented.
Concerns about this eﬀect — imperfect transferability — are not limited to
people in the real world. In much of economic analysis, the utility among
individuals is not fully transferable (“non-transferable,” or NTU, in the par-
lance).1 Partners may be risk averse with limited insurance possibilities; in-
centive or enforcement problems may restrict the way in which the joint
output can be divided; or policy makers may impose rules about how out-
put may be shared within relationships. As Becker (1973) pointed out long
ago, rigidities that prevent partners from costlessly dividing the gains from
a match may change the matching outcome, even if the level of output con-
tinues to satisfy monotone diﬀerences in type.
While interest in the issues represented by the non-transferable case is
both long-standing and lively (see for instance Farrell-Scotchmer, 1988 on
production in partnerships; Rosenzweig-Stark, 1989 on risk sharing in house-
holds; and more recently, Lazear, 2000 on incentive schemes for workers;
Ackerberg-Botticini, 2002 on sharecropping; and Chiappori-Salani´ e, 2003 on
the empirics of contracts), for the analyst seeking to characterize the equilib-
rium matching pattern in such settings, there is little theoretical guidance.
The purpose of this paper is to oﬀer some. We present suﬃcient conditions
for assortative matching that are simple to express, intuitive to understand,
and, we hope, tractable to apply. We illustrate their use with some examples
that are of independent interest.
The class of models we consider are two-person matching games without
1This terminology dates from the 1950’s and refers to all models that depart from
the transferable utility assumption. In some circles, the term nontransferable has been
used to refer solely to the extreme situation in which there is no possibility for making
transfers; this special case will not occupy much of our attention here. Smith (2002) oﬀers
an analysis of that case, with particular attention devoted to search frictions.
2search frictions in which the utility possibility frontier for any pair of agents
is a strictly decreasing function. After introducing the model and providing
formal deﬁnitions of the monotone matching patterns, we review the logic of
the classical transferable utility results, a close of examination of which leads
us to propose the “generalized diﬀerence conditions” (GDC) that suﬃce to
guarantee monotone matching for any type distribution (Proposition 1). We
then apply them to a simple model of risk sharing within households.
As it is often easier to verify properties of functions locally than globally,
we also present diﬀerential conditions for monotone matching (Proposition 2).
Though stronger than the GDC, the diﬀerential conditions oﬀer additional
insight into the forces governing matching. In particular, they highlight
the role not only of the complementarity in partners’ types that ﬁgures in
the TU case, but also of complementarity between type and the degree of
transferability (slope of the frontier) that is the new feature in the NTU
case. Even if the output satisﬁes increasing diﬀerences in types, failure of the
type-transferability complementarity — as happens if higher types are more
“diﬃcult” than lower ones — may overturn the predictions of the TU model
and lead instead to negative assortative matching or some more complex
and/or distribution-dependent pattern.
We use the diﬀerential conditions to study a model in which principals
with diﬀerent monitoring technologiesa r em a t c h e dt oa g e n t sw i t hd i ﬀer-
ent wealths, one interpretation of which may address some puzzling results
concerning the assignment of peasants to crop types in the empirical share-
cropping literature. In the example, the type-transferability relationship is
responsible for the predicted matching pattern, which goes in a (possibly)
unexpected direction.
We then go on to discuss other techniques that facilitate application of
the generalized diﬀerence conditions. For instance, the truth of the GDC
depends only on the ordinal properties of preferences (Proposition 4); this
fact broadens the scope of applicability of the local conditions (Corollary
1). We also consider the relationship between the GDC and more familiar
diﬀerence conditions, including lattice theoretic notions (Propositions 5 and
6), and devote some attention to necessary conditions for monotone matching
(Proposition 7).
The next section delves further into the ideas underlying the general the-
oretical analysis by examining a very simple example. It then introduces the
two models that will be used to illustrate the application of our results.
32 Issues and Examples
How do nontransferabilities aﬀect the matching pattern? Consider the fol-
lowing example, which is inspired by the one in Becker (1973).
Example 1 Suppose there are two types of men, l<h ,and two types of
women, L<H. The total “output” they produce when matched, as a function





Note that the output function satisﬁes decreasing diﬀerences (DD),s i n c e
9 − 7 < 7 − 4. If utility is fully transferable, then it is well known that de-
creasing diﬀerences implies that a stable outcome will always involve negative
assortative matching (NAM): high types will match with low types. If to the
c o n t r a r yw eh a dap o s i t i v em a t c ho ft h ef o r mhl,Li, hh,Hi with equilibrium
payoﬀs (ul,u L) and (uh,u H), then there would always be a pair of types that
could do strictly better for themselves: ul + uh =( 4− uL)+( 9− uH) <
(7 − uH)+( 7− uL); thus ul < 7 − uH or uh < 7 − uL; l could oﬀer H
(or h could oﬀer L) slightly more than her current payoﬀ and still get more
for himself, destabilizing the positive match. The negative matching outcome
maximizes total output.
Suppose instead that utility is not perfectly transferable, and consider the
extreme case in which any departure from equal sharing within the marriage
is impossible. For instance, the payoﬀ to the marriage could be generated by
the joint consumption of a local public good. Thus each partner in hh,Hi
gets 4.5, each in hh,Li gets 3.5, etc. Now the only stable outcome is positive
assortative matching (PAM): each h is better oﬀ matching with H (4.5) than
with L (3.5), and thus the “power couple” blocks a negative assortative match.
As Becker noted, with nontransferability, the match changes, and aggregate
performance suﬀe r sa sw e l l .
Of course this extreme form of nontransferability is not representative of
most situations of economic interest, and we wonder what happens in the
intermediate cases.
Example 2 Modify the previous example by introducing a dose of transfer-
ability: some compensation, say through the return of favors, makes it possi-
ble to depart from equal sharing. Consider two simple cases. In the ﬁrst, the
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Figure 1: Utility possibility frontiers for Example 2.
frog is a prince. That is, utility is perfectly transferable between l and L, l
can transfer to H, but not vice versa, and L can transfer to h but not vice
versa. In the second case, the high types are easy and the low types diﬃcult.
See Figure 1, which depicts the utility possibility frontiers between pairs of
types, assuming feasible transfers are made starting from the equal sharing
point.
In the ﬁr s tc a s e ,t h ed e g r e eo ft r a n s f e r a b i l i t yi sdecreasing in type, and in
particular is changing in the same direction as (marginal) productivity. The
unique outcome is NAM in this case: if things were otherwise, a high type
could promise a low type almost 2.5, garnering a bit over 4.5 for itself, and
the low type will be happy to accept the oﬀer (the only way this could not
happen is if both l and L were getting at least 2.5, which is an impossibility).
In the second case, the degree of transferability is increasing in type, op-
posite the direction that productivity increases, and this opposition between
productivity and transferability is enough to overturn the TU outcome. The
easygoing high types now can get no more than 3.5 out of a mixed relation-
s h i p ,s ot h e yp r e f e ram a t c hw i t he a c ho t h e r ,w h e r e i n4 . 5w o u l db ea v a i l a b l e
to each.
5The basic intuitions contained in this second example carry over to the
general case, and are in a nutshell the content of our main results, Proposi-
tions 1 and 2.2 Transferability, and its dependence on type, can be as impor-
tant as productivity in determining the nature of sorting.
In the remainder of this section we present two less-contrived examples
that are representative of those considered in the literature. The ﬁrst is a
marriage market model in which partners vary in initial wealth (and risk at-
titude) and must share risks within their households. Although this topic has
attracted considerable attention in the development literature and economics
of the family, we are not aware of any attempts to establish formally what
the pattern of matching among agents with diﬀering risk attitudes would
be, something which is obviously important for empirical identiﬁcation, say
of risk-sharing versus income-generation motives for marriage and migration
(Rosenzweig-Stark, 1989).
The second is a principal-agent model in which agents vary in their initial
wealth (and therefore risk aversion), and principals vary in their ability to
monitor agents. Sorting eﬀects in this sort of model are of direct interest in
some applications (e.g., Newman, 1999; Prendergast, 2002) and are impor-
tant considerations in the econometrics of contracting (Ackerberg-Botticini,
2002).
Example 3 (Risk sharing in households). C o n s i d e ras t y l i z e dm a r r i a g e
market model in which the primary desideratum in choosing a mate is suit-
ability for risk sharing. We ignore gender in what follows, i.e., study a
“one-sided” model.
Suppose that household production is random, with a ﬁnite number of possi-
ble outcomes wi > 0 and associated probabilities πi. Each individual initially
has one unit of wealth; upon marriage, each receives a monetary wedding gift
from its parents, which is assumed to be proportional to the parents’ wealth.
Everyone is an expected utility maximizer; income y yields utility lny, and an
individual’s type is the wealth a>0 received as the wedding gift. Unmatched
agents receive no gift and therefore get utility zero. For informational or
enforcement reasons, the only risk sharing possibilities in this economy lie
within a household consisting of two agents. When partners match, their
(explicit or implicit) contract speciﬁes how each realization of the output will
be shared between them.
2The only diﬀerence is that we shall require the frontiers to be strictly decreasing; the
above examples could easily be modiﬁed to conform to this requirement without changing
any conclusion.
6Write the utility possibility frontier for a match between individuals of types




Σiπi ln(1 + a + wi − xi) s.t. Σiπi ln(1 + b + xi) ≥ v, (1)
Note that the wealth, including that received from the parents, can be trans-
ferred as part of the share in this set-up. The ﬁrst-order condition (known
as Borch’s rule) is 1
1+a+wi−xi = λ 1
1+b+xi, where λ is the multiplier on the
constraint, from which one solves for the optimal sharing rule:
xi =( wi + a + b +2 ) e
v−Σiπi ln(wi+a+b+2) − b − 1.
This yields
φ(a,b,v)=l n ( 1− e
v−Σiπi ln(wi+a+b+2))+Σiπi ln(wi + a + b +2 ) . (2)
Clearly, this function is not linear in v, so utility is only imperfectly
transferable: the cost to a of transferring a small amount to b depends on how
much each partner already has. The same is true of the following example.
Example 4 (Matching principals and agents). Principals, who diﬀer in
their ability to monitor eﬀo r t ,m u s tm a t c hw i t ha g e n t s ,w h od i ﬀer in ini-
tial wealth and therefore risk aversion. The question is whether the most
closely monitored tasks, which can be compensated via low-risk contracts,
are accepted by the most or least risk averse, i.e. the poorest or wealthiest
agents. Possible interpretations in include the occupational distinction be-
tween entrepreneurs and workers (the former bear much risk, the latter little
or none), the assignment of fund managers to diﬀerent portfolios, or the
assignment of crop varieties to peasants with diﬀerent wealth levels.
There is a continuum of risk-neutral principals with type indexed by p ∈
[p,1],p∈ (1
2,1), and an equal measure of agents with type index a>1. The
principal’s type is the probability that his agent’s eﬀort e, which can either
be 1 or 0, is correctly detected on his task. All tasks are equally productive,
yielding expected revenue π when eﬀort is high, and every principal wishes to
implement e =1(this amounts to assuming that p is suﬃciently high). All
agents derive utility lny from income y; their type represents initial wealth.
The frontier for a principal of type p who is matched to an agent of type
a is given by
φ(p,a,v)=m a x π − pw1 − (1 − p)w0
s.t. pln(a + w1)+( 1− p)ln(a + w0) − 1 ≥ v
pln(a + w1)+( 1− p)ln(a + w0) − 1 ≥ (1 − p)ln(a + w1)+pln(a + w0),
7where w1 and w0 are the wages paid in case the signal of eﬀort is 1 or 0
respectively. The second inequality is the incentive compatibility condition
that ensures the agent takes high eﬀort. The frontier for an agent of type a
m a t c h e dt oap r i n c i p a lo ft y p ep who gets v is
φ(a,p,v)=m a x pln(a + w1)+( 1− p)ln(a + w0) − 1
π − pw1 − (1 − p)w0 s.t. ≥ v
pln(a + w1)+( 1− p)ln(a + w0) − 1 ≥ (1 − p)ln(a + w1)+pln(a + w0),
The solution to these problems yields
φ(p,a,v)=π + a − e
v+1[pe
1−p
















Intuition might suggest that since wealthier agents are less risk averse,
they should be matched to tasks for which the signal quality is poor, since these
tasks are eﬀectively riskier. Indeed, when p =1 , the optimal contract is a ﬁxed
wage, since in equilibrium the agent will always generate the high eﬀort signal,
while for lower values of p the agent must bear some income risk. As we shall
see in Section 5.1 , this intuition is incomplete, and indeed misleading, and
the complete analysis can oﬀer an explanation for some seemingly puzzling
results in the empirical literature.
As with expression (2), (3) and (4) depict nontransferable utility models
in which the frontiers, though downward sloping, do not have constant unit
slope. As we have shown, the traditional techniques for determining matching
patterns do not apply in these cases. We shall revisit these examples as we
present our general results in order to illustrate their application. As it turns
out, these examples are both solvable by a variety of techniques.
3 Theoretical Preliminaries
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents who diﬀer in type,
which is taken to be a real-valued attribute such as skill, wealth, or risk
attitude. In the two-sided model, agents are also distinguished by a binary
“gender” (man-woman, ﬁrm-worker, etc.). Payoﬀs exceeding that obtained in
8autarchy, which for the general analysis we normalize to zero for all types,3 are
generated only if agents of opposite gender match. In the one-sided model,
there is no gender distinction, but positive payoﬀs still require a match (in
neither case is there any additional gain to matching with more than one
other agent). For simplicity, we will assume that the measure of agents on
each side of a two-sided model is equal. The type space A is a compact
subset of the real line (or such a set crossed with {0,1} in the two-sided
case4). The number of types may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite, and we think of there
being a continuum of each type.
The object of analytical interest to us is the utility possibility frontier
(since in equilibrium agents will always select an allocation on this frontier)
for each possible pairing of agents. This frontier will be represented by a
function φ(a,b,v) which denotes the maximum utility generated by a type a
i nam a t c hw i t hat y p eb who receives utility v. We take φ to be a primitive
of the model for the general analysis, although as in the examples we have
presented, it will often be derived from more fundamental assumptions about
technology, preferences and choices made by the partners after they match.
We shall sometimes refer to the ﬁrst argument of φ as “own type” and the
third argument as “payoﬀ.”
We assume throughout that this function is continuous and strictly de-
creasing in v and continuous in the types. If φ(a,b,v) can be written f(a,b)−
v, we have transferable utility (TU); otherwise, we have nontransferable util-
ity (NTU).
The maximum equilibrium payoﬀ that a could ever get in a match with
b is φ(a,b,0), since b would never accept a negative payoﬀ. By slight abuse
of notation, if v>φ(b,a,0), we will deﬁne φ(a,b,v)=0 . Note that φ(a,b,v)
is still strictly decreasing in [0,φ(b,a,0)] and that φ(b,a,φ(a,b,v)) = v for
all v in this interval: φ(b,a,·)a n dφ(a,b,·) are inverses there. In general, of
course, φ(a,b,v) 6= φ(b,a,v).
The notation reﬂects two further assumptions of matching models, namely
(1) that the payoﬀ possibilities depend only on the types of the agents and
not on their individual identities; and (2) the utility possibilities of the pair
of agents do not depend on what other agents in the economy are doing, i.e.,
there are no externalities across coalitions.5
3In many applications, the autarchy payoﬀ varies with type. For instance, in the
principal-agent example it is natural to assume that an unmatched agent a gets lna. The
analysis extends to this case almost without modiﬁcation: see Section 5.5.
4In this case, it is to be understood that in comparing types, one only considers at-
tributes of agents from the same side, i.e., “a>band c>d ” entails that a and b are on
one side, and c and d are on the other.
5Of course, in general, the equilibrium payoﬀs in one coalition will depend on the other
93.1 Equilibrium
It is useful to identify equilibrium with core allocations: we are interested in
specifying the way types are matched and the payoﬀ to each type. Speciﬁ-
cally, an equilibrium consists of a matching correspondence M∗ : A ⇒ A that
speciﬁe st h et y p e( s )t ow h i c he a c ht y p ei sm a t c h e d ,a n dap a y o ﬀ allocation
u∗ : A → R specifying the equilibrium utility achieved by each type (Lemma
1 below ensures that u∗ is a function; we will write u∗
a for its value at a).
The key property it satisﬁes is a stability or no-blocking condition: if u∗ is
the equilibrium payoﬀ allocation, then there is no pair a,b and payoﬀ v such
that φ(a,b,v) >u ∗
a and v>u ∗
b. In addition to this requirement, u∗ must sat-




a ≥ 0 for all a), and M∗ must be measure consistent,i . e . ,t h e
measure of ﬁrst partners must equal the measure of second partners (this
requirement arises because of the continuum of agents: it avoids situations
in which, say, one one-millionth of the population matches one-to-one with
the rest). Equilibria always exist under our assumptions.6
3.2 Descriptions of Equilibrium Matching Patterns
A match is a measurable correspondence
M
∗ : A ⇒ A.
M∗ is symmetric: a ∈ M∗ (b)i m p l i e sb ∈ M∗ (a). Let
A = {a ∈ A : ∃b ∈ M
∗ (a):a ≥ b}
be the set of larger partners. Obviously, A depends on M∗, but we suppress
this dependence in the notation. Note that in the case of two-sided matching,
we identify A with one of the sides.
Symmetry of M∗ implies that the correspondence M
M : A ⇒ A,where b ∈ M(a) ⇐⇒ b ∈ M
∗ (a)&a ≥ b,
completely characterizes the match. The coalitions generated by M∗ can
then be written as ordered pairs ha,bi ∈ A × M(A). Our descriptions of
coalitions.
6The facts that there is a continuum of agents and that the only coalitions that matter
are singletons and pairs make the core here a special case of the f-core. See Kaneko-
Wooders (1996) for deﬁnitions and existence results – with a continuum of types, they
also assume that the slopes of the frontiers are uniformly bounded away from zero, a
condition that is satisﬁed if the marginal utility of consumption at autarchy is not inﬁnite.
10matching patterns will be in terms of the properties of the graph of M. Note
that for a one-sided model, the graph of M is the portion of the graph of M∗
that is on or below the 450 line.
When M is a monotone correspondence, matching is monotone.W ec o n -
sider only a few types of monotone matching patterns in this paper. An
equilibrium satisﬁes segregation if M(a)={a} for all a. It satisﬁes posi-
tive assortative matching (PAM) if for all a,b ∈ A, a > b,c ∈ M(a),d ∈
M(b)= ⇒ c ≥ d,a n d negative assortative matching (NAM) if for all
a,b ∈ A, a > b,c ∈ M(a),d ∈ M(b)= ⇒ c ≤ d. In one sided models,
an alternative way to say that there is NAM is that whenever we have types
a>b≥ c>d , ha,ci,hb,di and ha,bi,hc,di, as well as segregation, are ruled
out as possible matches (only ha,di,hb,ci is permitted).
Note that while segregation only occurs in one-sided models, PAM and
NAM can occur in both one- and two-sided models. However, in this paper,
when we refer to PAM, we shall be referring exclusively to two-sided models.
Say that an equilibrium is payoﬀ equivalent to PAM if any four types
that are not matched in a positive assortative way can be rearranged among
themselves in a positive assortative way without changing their payoﬀs( f r o m
which it follows that the new match constructed this way, along with the
original payoﬀs, is also an equilibrium). 7 Payoﬀ equivalence to segregation
and to NAM are deﬁned analogously. For brevity, we will say that there
is segregation, PAM, or NAM if the equilibrium satisﬁes the corresponding
notion of payoﬀ equivalence.
For our purposes, the important consequence of payoﬀ equivalence is that
if a,b ∈ A with a>b ,c>d , ha,di andhb,ci are matches in an equilibrium





7Formally, (M,u ∗)i sp a y o ﬀ equivalent to PAM if whenever a,b ∈ A,a > b, c > d,
d ∈ M(a)a n dc ∈ M(b), there is another measure consistent match M0 with M0 = M on
A\{a,b},d∈ M0(b),c∈ M0(a) and either d/ ∈ M0(a)o rc/ ∈ M0(b) such that u∗ is feasible.
This falls short of saying that M0 satisﬁes PAM, but if the type distribution has ﬁnite
support and rational values, a straightforward algorithmic argument shows that if (M,u ∗)
is an equilbrium in which M violates PAM but is payoﬀ equivalent to it, then there is
another measure-consistent match c M such that (c M,u ∗) is an equilibrium that satisﬁes
PAM. Under standard regularity conditions, a limit argument establishes the same thing
for arbitrary distributions.
114S u ﬃcient Conditions for Monotone Match-
ing
4.1 Logic of the TU Case
Before proceeding, let’s recall the nature of the conventional transferable
utility result and why it is true, as that will provide us with guidance to
the general case. In the TU case, only the total payoﬀ f(a,b) is relevant.
The assumption that is often made about f is that it satisﬁes increasing
diﬀerences (ID): whenever a>band c>d ,f(c,a)−f(d,a) ≥ f(c,b)−f(d,b).
Why does this imply positive assortative matching (segregation in the one-
sided case), irrespective of the distribution of types? Usually, the argument
is made by noticing that the total output among the four types is maximized
(a necessary condition of equilibrium in the TU case, but not, we should
emphasize, in the case of NTU) when a matches with c and b with d:t h i si s
evident from rearranging the ID condition.
However, it is more instructive to analyze this from the equilibrium point
of view. Suppose that a and b c o m p e t ef o rt h er i g h tt om a t c hw i t hc rather
than d. The increasing diﬀerence condition says that a can outbid b in this
competition, since the incremental output produced if a switches to c exceeds
that when b switches. In particular, this is true whatever the level of utility
v that d might be receiving: rewrite ID as f(c,a) − [f(d,a) − v] ≥ f(c,b) −
[f(d,b) − v]; this is literally the statement that a’s willingness to pay for
c,g i v e nt h a td is getting v, exceeds b’s. Thus a situation in which a is
matched with d and b with c is never stable: a will be happy to oﬀer more
to c than the latter is getting with b.8 The ID result is distribution free:t h e
type distribution will aﬀect the equilibrium payoﬀs, but the argument just
given shows that a’s partner must be larger than b’s regardless of what those
payoﬀsm i g h tb e .
The convenient feature of TU is that if a outbids b at one level of v, he
does so for all v. Such is not the case with NTU. Our suﬃcient condition will
require explicitly that a can outbid b for all levels of v. If this requirement
seems strong, recall that the nature of the result sought, namely monotone
matching regardless of the distribution, is also strong. By the same token, it
is weaker than ID, and includes TU as a special case.
In an NTU model, the division of the surplus between the partners cannot
be separated from the level that they generate. Switching to a higher type
8This assumes that b prefers to be with c than with d in the ﬁrst place — else b can
upset the match himself — so if b is getting v0 with c, f(c,b) − v0 <f (c,b) − [f(d,b) − v]
follows from v0 >f(d,b) − v
12partner may not be attractive if it is also more costly to transfer utility
to a high type, that is, if the frontier is steeper. A suﬃcient condition for
PAM is that not only is there the usual complementarity in the production
of surplus, but also there is a complementarity in the transfer of surplus —
frontiers are ﬂatter, as well as higher, for higher types. This will perhaps be
more apparent from the local form of our conditions.
4.2 Generalized Diﬀerence Conditions
Let a>band c>dand suppose that d were to get v.T h e n t h e a b o v e
reasoning would suggest that a would be able to outbid b for c if
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)). (5)
The left-hand side is a’s willingness to “pay” (in utility terms) for c rather
than d, given that d receives v (a then receives x = φ(a,d,v), so c would get
φ(c,a,x)i fm a t c h e dw i t ha). The right-hand side is the counterpart expres-
sion for b. Thus the condition says in eﬀect that a can outbid b in an attempt
to match with c instead of d.
If this is true for any value of v then we expect that an equilibrium will
never have a matched with d while b is matched with c. B u tt h i si sa l lt h a t
is meant by PAM: a’s partner can never be smaller than b’s. In the case of
one sided models, taking c = a and d = b g i v e su ss e g r e g a t i o n :e v e r y o n e ’ s
partner is identical to himself.
Before proceeding, we shall need to establish that equilibria in this en-
vironment satisfy an equal treatment property: all agents of the same type
receive the same equilibrium payoﬀ. The reason that an argument needs to
be made is that this is not a general property of the core in NTU models.9
But continuity and strictly decreasing frontiers ensure it is satisﬁed.
Lemma 1 (Equal Treatment) All agents of the same type receive the same
equilibrium payoﬀ.
Proof. Suppose that there are two agents i and j of type a getting dif-
ferent utilities vi >v j, and that i’s partner k is of type b. Then k gets
φ(b,a,vi) < φ(b,a,vj), where the inequality follows from the fact that φ
is strictly decreasing in v. By continuity, there exists ²>0 such that
9Suppose there are two types, a and b,with the measure of the b’s exceeding that of
the a’s. If an a and a b match, each gets a payoﬀ of exactly 1, while unmatched agents or
agents who match with their own type get 0. There is no means to transfer utilty. Then
any allocation in which every a is matched to a b, with the remaining b’s unmatched, is





Figure 2: Generalized Increasing Diﬀerences
φ(b,a,vj + ²) > φ(b,a,vi); {k,j} can therefore block the equilibrium, a con-
tradiction.
This result allows us to refer to a type’s payoﬀ without ambiguity.
When satisﬁed by any v, a > b, and c>d ,condition (5) is called Gener-
alized Increasing Diﬀerences (GID).10 The concept is illustrated in Figure 1.
The frontiers for the matched pairs hb,di,hb,ci,ha,ci, and ha,di are plotted
in a four-axis diagram. The compositions in (5) are indicated by following
the arrows around from a level of utility v for d. Note that the utility c ends
up with on the “a side” exceeds that on the b side of the diagram.
Our main result states that GID is suﬃcient for segregation (PAM in the
two-sided case). There is an analogous condition, Generalized Decreasing
Diﬀerences (GDD), for NAM.
Proposition 1 (1) A suﬃcient condition for segregation in one-sided models
and PAM in two-sided models is generalized increasing diﬀerences (GID) on
10The designation Generalized Increasing Diﬀerences is motivated as follows. Let A be
t h et y p es p a c ea n dG be a (partially) ordered group with operation ∗ and order %.W e
are interested in maps ψ : A2 → G.
Consider the condition
a>band c>dimplies ψ(c,a) ∗ ψ(d,a)−1 % ψ(c,b) ∗ ψ(d,b)−1,
where ψ(·,·)−1 denotes the inverse element under the group operation. When G = R, %
= the usual real order, and ∗ = real addition, this is just ID. GID corresponds to the
case in which G = monotone functions from R to itself, % = the pointwise order, and ∗ =
functional composition.
14[0,φ(d,a,0)]: whenever a>b ,c>d ,and v ∈ [0,φ(d,a,0)], φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥
φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)).
(2) A suﬃcient condition for NAM is generalized decreasing diﬀerences
(GDD) on [0,φ(d,b,0)]:w h e n e v e r a>b ,c>d ,and v ∈ [0,φ(d,b,0)],
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≤ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v).
Proof. Here we consider only the one-sided cases; the two-sided cases are
similar. For segregation, suppose that instead we have an equilibrium (M,u ∗)
that is not payoﬀ equivalent to segregation: there is a positive measure of
heterogeneous matches of the form ha,bi. Then stability implies a doesn’t
















By payoﬀ nonequivalence, at least one of these inequalities is strict (say it’s
the ﬁrst), else matching a with a and b with b with is also an equilibrium.












which contradicts the GID condition (taking c = a and d = b there), and we
conclude that the economy is segregated.
F o ro n e - s i d e dN A M ,i ts u ﬃces to rule out as possible equilibrium matches
(ha,bi,hc,di)a n d( ha,ci,hb,di) whenever a>b≥ c>d ,and matches of the
form (ha,ai,hb,bi) for arbitrary a 6= b. Suppose to the contrary that ha,bi















(b weakly prefers a to c). At least one of these is strict; assume it’s the ﬁrst.





























w h i c ha g a i nc o n t r a d i c t sG D D .
Finally, if ha,ai and hb,bi are stable, and without loss of generality a>b ,





equal treatment, and u∗
a > φ(a,b,u∗
b), by stability and payoﬀ nonequivalence.

























We now apply this result our model of risk sharing within households.
Example 5 We claim that the GDD is satisﬁed in the risk sharing example.
Recall from (2) that φ(a,b,v)=l n ( 1 − ev−Σab)+Σab, where Σab denotes
Σiπi ln(wi + a + b +2 ) . Now let a>band c>d .Then
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)=l n ( 1− e
ln(1−ev−Σad)+Σad−Σac)+Σac

















that is if eΣac−eΣad <e Σbc−eΣbd. This is just the requirement that the function




Thus GDD is indeed satisﬁed, and we conclude that in the risk-sharing econ-
omy with logarithmic utility, agents will always match negatively in wealth.
This is intuitive: a risk-neutral agent is willing to oﬀer a better deal for in-
surance than is a risk averse one, so those demanding the most insurance
(the most risk averse, i.e., the poor) will share risk with the least risk averse
(the rich), while the moderately risk averse share with each other.
5 Computational Aids
A number of useful computational techniques follow from the suﬃciency of
the GID and GDD. We ﬁrst present a set of diﬀerential conditions. In ad-
dition to being easy to apply, they help sharpen the intuition about the
trade-oﬀs at work in NTU matching problems.
Next we note that GID and GDD are preserved under ordinal transfor-
mations of types’ preferences. This implies that the analyst is free to choose
whichever representation of preferences is most convenient, and leads to a
weakening of the diﬀerential conditions. In case the NTU model admits a
TU representation, GID and GDD reduce to ID and DD of the joint payoﬀ
function.
Finally, we develop the lattice-theoretic versions of our conditions and
conclude he section with a remark on models with type-dependent autarchy
payoﬀs.
5.1 Diﬀerential Conditions
Often it is easier to check whether a condition holds locally than globally,
particularly if a closed-form expression for the frontier is not available. We
now provide a set of local conditions which suﬃce for monotone matching.
In addition to being computationally convenient, these conditions illuminate
the “complementarity in transferability” property alluded to above. In this
17subsection we suppose that φ(x,y,v)i st w i c ed i ﬀerentiable (except of course
at v = φ(y,x,0)).
Proposition 2 (i) A suﬃcient condition for segregation (or PAM) is that
for all x,y ∈ A × A and v ∈ [0,φ(y,x,0)),
φ12(x,y,v) ≥ 0,φ13(x,y,v) ≥ 0 and φ1(x,y,v) ≥ 0. (8)
(ii) A suﬃcient condition for NAM is that for all x,y ∈ A × A and v ∈
[0,φ(y,x,0)),
φ12(x,y,v) ≤ 0,φ13(x,y,v) ≤ 0 and φ1(x,y,v) ≥ 0. (9)
Proof. We show that the local conditions imply the generalized diﬀerence
conditions. Fix v, a > b and c>d ,and consider the case (i) for segrega-
tion/PAM (the other case is similar). Then φ12 ≥ 0 implies that for any
t ∈ [d,c]
φ1(t,a,φ(b,d,v)) ≥ φ1(t,b,φ(b,d,v));




Integrating both sides of this inequality over t from d to c then gives
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) − φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)) − φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v));
Noting that φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) = φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) = v g i v e su sG I D .
Obviously, with TU, φ13 =0 , so this reduces to the standard condition
in that case. The extra term reﬂects the fact that changing the type results
in a change in the slope of the frontier. For segregation/PAM, the idea is
that higher types can transfer utility to their partners more easily (φ3 is less
negative, hence ﬂatter).
The conditions in Proposition 2 illustrate the separate roles of both the
usual “productivity” complementarity and the “transferability” complemen-
tarity we have mentioned. In terms of the bidding story we mentioned in
18Section 4.1, if two diﬀerent types are competing for a higher partner, both
will have to oﬀer her more than they would a lower partner (φ1 > 0); if the
higher type’s frontier is ﬂatter than the lower’s frontier (φ13 ≥ 0), it will cost
the higher type less to do this than it will the lower one; meanwhile if the
high type is also more productive on the margin (φ12 > 0) then he is sure to
win, in eﬀect being both more productive and having lower costs.
To be sure, it is not necessary for the two eﬀects to be operative in
the same direction: for segregation/PAM one only needs the net eﬀect to
be positive. Indeed, the conditions in Proposition 2 imply that the potential
utility gains from an increase in one’s attribute are monotonic in the partner’s
attribute: if (8) holds,
d
da
φ1(t,a,φ(a,t,v)) = φ12(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) + φ13(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) · φ1(b,d,v) ≥ 0,
(10)
and if (9) does, then
φ12(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) + φ13(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) · φ1(b,d,v) ≤ 0; (11)
but the reverse implications are not true.11
Closely related conditions are suﬃcient for monotone matching, if perhaps
harder to verify than (8) and (9). Like (10) and (11), they involve composi-
tions of φ and its partial derivatives; we simply mention them without further
comment; the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 If φ is smooth, a suﬃcient condition for segregation/PAM
is that for all types x,y,z with z ≤ x, and utilities v,
φ12(x,y,φ(y,z,v)) + φ13(x,y,φ(y,z,v)) · φ1(y,z,v) ≥ 0.
As u ﬃcient condition for NAM is that for all types x,y,z with z ≤ x, and
utilities v,
φ12(x,y,φ(y,z,v)) + φ13(x,y,φ(y,z,v)) · φ1(y,z,v) ≤ 0.
11In fact, (10) and (11) are implied by the generalized diﬀerence conditions. To see
this, take a>band c>dand note that GID is equivalent to φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) −
φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v))−φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v)). Dividing by c−d and taking limits
as c → d yields φ1(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ1(d,b,φ(b,d,v)). Dividing by a−b and letting a → b
yields
φ12(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) + φ13(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) · φ1(b,d,v) ≥ 0,
as claimed. The GDD case is similar.
19The condition φ1 ≥ 0 in Propositions 2 and 3 is less restrictive than might
ﬁrst appear: in a model in which instead 0 ≥ φ1 everywhere, one can redeﬁne
the type space with the “reverse” order; then the cross partial φ12 retains its
sign, while φ13 and φ1 reverse sign and Proposition 2 can be applied (in other
words, if φ1 ≤ 0 everywhere, then monotone matching occurs when φ12 and
φ13 are opposite-signed).
Finally, we show in the next subsection that the diﬀerential conditions can
be weakened further by considering increasing transformations of preferences.
Example 6 Earlier we conjectured that the most risk averse agents ought to
match with the most well monitored tasks, since the latter are optimally con-
tracted as ﬁxed wages. This intuition is incomplete, and indeed misleading,
as the following application of Proposition 2 indicates.
Recall from (3) and (4) that
φ(p,a,v)=π + a − e
v+1[pe
1−p


































and when own type is an agent, φ1(a,p,v)= 1





¢2 > 0. Moreover, φ12 =0in either case.
Thus the agents with lower risk aversion (higher wealth) are matched to
principals with higher quality signals, i.e. more observable tasks. This result
may appear surprising, since empirically we tend to associate less observable
tasks to wealthier workers (in particular one would expect the poor to take
ﬁxed wages while the rich bear risk).
The explanation for the result is that in the standard version of the
principal-agent model with utility additively separable in income and eﬀort,
incentive compatibility for a given eﬀort level entails that the amount of risk
borne by the agent increases with wealth (in this case, the variance of the









). This eﬀect arises from the
diminishing marginal utility of income. Though wealthier agents tolerate risk
20better than the poor, they must accept more risk on a given task; with loga-
rithmic utility (and indeed for many other utilities — see Newman, 1999), the
latter eﬀect dominates, and the wealthy therefore prefer the safer tasks. Put
another way, better monitoring allows for a reduction in risk borne by the
agent; given the increasing risk eﬀect of incentive compatibility, the beneﬁto f
the risk reduction is greater for the rich than for the poor, and this generates
a complementarity between monitoring and wealth.
The result oﬀers a possible explanation for the ﬁnding in Ackerberg-Botticini
(2002) that in medieval Tuscany, wealthy peasants were more likely than poor
peasants to tend safe crops (cereals) rather than risky ones (vines).
T h i se x a m p l ei si n s t r u c t i v eb e c a u s et h ee n t i r ee ﬀect comes from the non-
transferability of the problem. There is no direct “productive” interaction
between principal type and agent type (φ12 = 0); only the complementarity
between type and transferability plays a role in determining the match.
Finally, as is apparent from their derivation, the local conditions are
stronger than generalized diﬀerence conditions, even restricting to smooth
frontier functions. This is of practical as well as logical interest: as we
saw, Example 3 satisﬁes GDD, from which we concluded there is nega-
tive matching in wealth. But in spite being smooth, φ(a,b,v)=l n ( 1 −






























Thus, for some models, the generalized diﬀerence conditions may apply
while the local conditions do not.12 However, in such cases, it may be possible
to ﬁnd an alternate representation of agents’ preferences in which the frontiers
do satisfy the local conditions.
12Of course, (11) is satisﬁed for this example, as it must be since it is a consequence of
GDD:
215.2 Order Preserving Transformations
The core of an economy is independent of the cardinal representation of
preferences; in particular the matching pattern must not depend on how
o n er e p r e s e n t st h ep r e f e r e n c e so ft h ea g e n t s . H o w e v e r ,s of a rw eh a v eo n l y
established suﬃciency of the generalized diﬀerence conditions for monotone
matching, and so it is legitimate to ask whether they hold after monotone
transformations of types’ utilities.
Suppose that
φ(a,b,v)=m a x
x,x0 U(x,a)s . t .U(x
0,b) ≥ v,
where x and x0 a r ec h o i c ev a r i a b l e st a k e nt ob ei ns o m ef e a s i b l es e t .L e th be
an increasing transformation applied to one type’s utility, say t: we replace
U(x,t)b yh(U(x,t)), φ(t,b,v)b yh(φ(t,b,v)) and φ(b,t,v)b yφ(b,t,h−1(v)).
We have the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose GID (GDD) holds for φ. Then GID (GDD) holds
for any other frontier function generated from φ by monotone transformations
of types’ utilities.
Proof. We consider the case for GID; the proof for GDD is virtually
identical. Note that it is enough to show that if GID holds for φ, then it
holds for the frontier function derived by transforming a single type’s utility;
the proposition is veriﬁed by repeating the argument for all types.
To show that GID also holds for the new frontier function, suppose ﬁrst
that t = c in the expression
a>b ,c>d ,v∈ [0,φ(d,b,0)] =⇒ φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)).


























































w + a + b +2
) < 0.
22Then we simply need to apply h to both sides of the implied inequality, which
obviously preserves its truth value. If t = a, then only the left hand side is
aﬀected: we get φ(c,a,h−1(h(φ(a,d,v)))) = φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)), so again the
GID holds under the new representation of preferences. And if t = d, then
we need
z ∈ [h(0),h(φ(d,b,0)] =⇒ φ(c,a,φ(a,d,h
−1(z))) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,h
−1(z))),
which follows from the fact that h−1(z) always lies in [0,φ(d,b,0)].
We shall call a frontier function ˆ φ generated from φ by subjecting all
types’ utilities to increasing transformations a representation of φ. A suitably
chosen representation of φ m a yb ee a s i e rt ow o r kw i t ht h a nφ itself:
Example 7 I nt h er i s ks h a r i n ge x a m p l et h ef r o n t i e rw a sc o m p u t e dt ob e
φ(a,b,v)=l n ( 1− ev−Σab)+Σab, where Σab ≡
P
πi ln(a + b + wi +2 ) . If
we transform the utility by exponentiation (doing so for all types), we get
ˆ φ(a,b,v)=eφ(a,b,lnv) = eln(1−eln v−Σab)+Σab = eΣab − v. This function appears
to be more manageable than φ; indeed ˆ φ is a transferable utility represen-
tation of φ (more on this in the next subsection). GDD for ˆ φ is satisﬁed:
ˆ φ(c,a, ˆ φ(a,d,v)) < ˆ φ(c,b, ˆ φ(b,d,v)) ⇐⇒ eΣca − (eΣad − v) <e Σcb − (eΣbd −
v) ⇐⇒ eΣab satisﬁes DD, which we veriﬁed earlier.
Though the generalized diﬀerence conditions are preserved for all repre-
sentations of φ, not so the diﬀerential conditions in Proposition 2. Recall
that in the risk sharing example, those conditions do not hold for φ. But
they do for the above transformed version of ˆ φ :i n d e e d ,ˆ φ1 > 0, ˆ φ12 < 0, and
ˆ φ13 =0 . This suggests the following strengthening of Proposition 2, whose
proof is an immediate consequence of the fact that the diﬀerential conditions
imply GID, which in turn implies GID of any representation of φ.
Corollary 1 (1) A suﬃcient condition for segregation (or PAM) is that
there exists a representation ˆ φ of φ such that for all x,y ∈ A × A and
v ∈ [0,φ(y,x,0)),
ˆ φ12(x,y,v) ≥ 0, ˆ φ13(x,y,v) ≥ 0 and ˆ φ1(x,y,v) ≥ 0.
(2) A suﬃcient condition for NAM is that there exists a representation ˆ φ of
φ such that for all x,y ∈ A × A and v ∈ [0,φ(y,x,0)),
ˆ φ12(x,y,v) ≤ 0, ˆ φ13(x,y,v) ≤ 0 and ˆ φ1(x,y,v) ≥ 0.
235.3 TU Representability
We noted that by transforming the payoﬀs of the agents in the risk shar-
ing example, we could express the frontiers in a transferable utility form.
This cannot be done with all NTU model s ,o fc o u r s e( s e eL e g r o s - N e w m a n ,
2003 for more on this topic), but there are some well-known-examples. For
instance, the Principal-Agent model with exponential utility (Holmstrom-
Milgrom, 1987) can be given a TU representation by looking at players’ cer-
tainty equivalent incomes rather than their expected utility levels. Another
instance is the principal-agent example in this paper.
Start with a model φ(a,b,v) and say that it is TU-representable if there is
a set of increasing transformations F(t,·), indexed by type t, and a function
of types ψ(t,t0) such that
∀a,b,v, F(a,φ(a,b,v)) = ψ(a,b) − F(b,v).
Then F(a,φ(a,b,v)) is a TU model, since the transformed payoﬀst o
(a,b)s u mt oψ(a,b), independently of the distribution of transformed utility
between a and b. It follows from the deﬁnition that ψ is symmetric.13 The
main observation of this subsection is the following
Proposition 5 Suppose that φ has a TU representation (F,ψ).T h e n φ
satisﬁes GID (GDD) if and only if ψ satisﬁes ID (DD).
Proof. Take a>b ,c>d ,a n dv and assume GID holds. Then
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v))
⇐⇒ F(c,φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v))) ≥ F(c,φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)))
⇐⇒ ψ(c,a) − F(a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ ψ(c,b) − F(b,φ(b,d,v))
⇐⇒ ψ(c,a) − ψ(a,d)+F(d,v) ≥ ψ(c,b) − ψ(b,d)+F(d,v)
⇐⇒ ψ(c,a) − ψ(d,a) ≥ ψ(c,b) − ψ(d,a),
i.e. ψ satisﬁes increasing diﬀerences. The proof for GDD simply reverses all
the weak inequalities.














, which satisﬁes ID: matching is always positive assortative.
13To see this, note that F(b,φ(b,a,v)) = ψ(b,a) − F(a,v), but F(a,v)=
F(a,φ(a,b,φ(b,a,v))) = ψ(a,b)−F(b,φ(b,a,v)), so that F(b,φ(b,a,v)) = ψ(a,b)−F(a,v);
hence ψ(a,b)=ψ(b,a).
245.4 Lattice Theoretic Conditions
Proposition 2 can be weakened by considering (possibly) nondiﬀerentiable
functions that are supermodular in pairs of variables.
Proposition 6 (1) A suﬃcient condition for segregation (PAM in two sided
m o d e l s )i st h a tφ is supermodular in types, increasing in own type, and su-
permodular in own type and payoﬀ.
(2) A suﬃcient condition for NAM is that φ is submodular in types, increas-
ing in own type and submodular in own type and payoﬀ.
Proof. Consider case (1); the other case is similar. Take v, a > b and c>d .
Supermodularity in own type and partner’s utility, along with increasing in
own type implies φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) + φ(d,a,φ(b,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,a,φ(b,d,v)) +
φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)), or φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v))−φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,a,φ(b,d,v))−
φ(d,a,φ(b,d,v)). But the right hand side of the latter inequality weakly ex-
ceeds φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v))−φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) by supermodularity in types. Thus
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v))−φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v))−φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v)), and
since φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) = φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) = v,φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) ≥ φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)),
which is GID.
It is evident from this proposition that a stronger suﬃcient condition
for segregation (or PAM) is that φ itself is a supermodular function that is
increasing in own type, since this implies the condition in Proposition 6.14
The principal interest of this observation is that it enables us to oﬀer
suﬃcient conditions for monotone matching expressed in terms of the fun-
damentals of the model, rather than in terms of the frontiers (such results
leading to our local conditions would be much harder to come by).







Here Φ(a,b) ⊂ X, a (sub)lattice of some Rn, is the set of choices available
to types (a,b). A suﬃcient condition for φ to be increasing in own type
14More directly, given v, a > b and c>d ,put x =( d,a,φ(a,d,v)) and y =
(c,b,φ(b,d,v)) in the deﬁning inequality φ(x ∨ y)+φ(x ∧ y) ≥ φ(x)+φ(y). Then since
φ(a,d,v) ≥ φ(b,d,v), x ∨ y =( c,a,φ(a,d,v)), x ∧ y =( d,b,φ(b,d,v)),and we have
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) + φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) ≥ φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)) + φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)),
which is just GID since φ(d,b,φ(b,d,v)) = φ(d,a,φ(a,d,v)=v.
25is that U is increasing in type and Φ is continuous and increasing (in the
set inclusion order) in own type. A suﬃcient condition for φ to be strictly
decreasing in v is that U is strictly monotone in x.
We also need the set
S = {(a,b,v,x,x
0)|a ∈ A,b ∈ A,v ∈ R,(x,x
0) ∈ Φ(a,b)}
to form a sublattice. Then an application of Theorem 2.7.2 of Topkis (1998)
yields
Corollary 2 If payoﬀs functions are supermodular (submodular), strictly in-
creasing in choices, and increasing in type; choice sets are continuous and
increasing in own type; and the set of types, payoﬀs and feasible choices
forms a sublattice, then the economy is segregated in the one-sided case and
positively matched in the two-sided case (negatively matched).
Topkis’s theorem tells us that under the stated hypotheses, φ will be
supermodular (submodular); since it is also increasing in own type by the
hypotheses on F and U, the result follows.
As a practical matter, the usefulness of this corollary hinges on the ease
of verifying that the sets S and F have the required properties. In many
cases it may be more straightforward to compute the frontiers and apply
Propositions 1, 2, or 6. Note, for example, that since the frontier function in
the risk-sharing example is not submodular despite the fact that the objective
function is, the choice-parameter set S is not a sublattice.15
5.5 Type-Dependent Autarchy Payoﬀs
Suppose that autarchy generates a payoﬀ u(a)t ot y p ea;i fA is compact
and u(·) continuous, without loss of generality, we can assume u(a) ≥ 0.
15One might also wonder about the relationship between GID and quasi-supermodularity
(QSM) (Milgrom-Shannon, 1994; Topkis, 1998). In terms of the notation in footnote 10,
the map ψ : A2 → G is quasi-supermodular if ψ(x) % ψ(x ∧ y)= ⇒ ψ(x ∨ y) % ψ(y), with
the same implication holding for the strict order; putting x =( b,c)a n dy =( a,d)t h i sc a n
be stated as a>b , c>d ,and ψbc % ψbd implies ψac % ψad. Equivalently, we must have
ψcb ◦ ψbd % Id implies ψca ◦ ψad % Id, where Id is the identity map. GID of ψ clearly
implies QSM of ψ, but not vice versa: suppose that for some types a,b,c,d and payoﬀ v
we have φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) < φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)) <v ;t h u sφ (and ψ) violates GID, but ψ does
not violate QSM. Moreover, QSM is not suﬃcient for PAM: if QSM is satisﬁed and GID is
not, as in this case, there is a type distribution for which the equilibrium is NAM rather
than PAM (the logic parallels that in Section 5.6). A similar set of relationships can be
demonstrated if we ask for QSM of φ rather than ψ.
26Then all the propositions go through as before, since if the generalized dif-
ference or diﬀerential conditions hold for nonnegative payoﬀs, they hold on
the restricted domain of individually rational ones. Equilibrium will now
typically entail that some types remain unmatched (even apart from excess
supply issues), but among those matched, the pattern will be monotone if
the appropriate diﬀerence condition holds.
5.6 Necessity
A natural issue to consider at this point is the strength of the suﬃcient
conditions we have given for monotone matching: is GID necessary for PAM?
H e r ew ec a ng i v ea na ﬃrmative answer for the two-sided case:
Proposition 7 I nat w o - s i d e dm o d e l ,i ft h ee q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m ei sP A M
(NAM) for all distributions of types, then the frontier function φ satisﬁes
GID (GDD).
Proof. C o n s i d e rP A M ,a st h ec a s ef o rt h en e c e s s i t yo fG D Df o rN A Mi s
similar. Suppose there exist a>bon one side and c>don the other, and
ap a y o ﬀ level v such that φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) < φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)). Then we can
ﬁnd a distribution of types such that there is an equilibrium that is not payoﬀ
equivalent to PAM. To see this, put an equal measure at each of the four
types a,b,c,d. Then there is ²>0 such that ha,di with payoﬀs( φ(a,d,v),v)
and hb,ci with payoﬀs( φ(b,d,v)+²,φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)+²)) is an equilibrium.
To verify stability, note that by continuity of φ in v, for ² small enough,
φ(c,a,φ(a,d,v)) < φ(c,b,φ(b,d,v)+²). Thus c would be strictly worse oﬀ
switching to a as long as a r e c e i v e sa tl e a s th i se q u i l i b r i u mp a y o ﬀ; similarly
d would do strictly worse to switch to b.
The one-sided case is a bit more involved. It is known that in the one-sided
TU model that ID is not necessary for segregation, and that this condition
can be weakened to nonpositivity of a function derived from the joint payoﬀ
called the surplus. One-sided PAM (outside of the deﬁnition of which we
have not considered here) and NAM are equivalent to something called weak
increasing diﬀerences and weak decreasing diﬀerences of this derived function
(Legros-Newman, 2002a).
When utility is nontransferable, a similar construction can be performed
in which a surplus function is derived from the frontier φ; suitably weak-
ened versions of the generalized diﬀerence conditions deﬁned for the surplus
function are then necessary as well as suﬃcient for monotone matching. The
interested reader is referred to Legros-Newman (2002c).
276C o n c l u s i o n
6.1 Summary
Many economic situations involving nontransferable utility are naturally mod-
eled as matching or assignment games. For these to have much use, it is
necessary to characterize equilibrium matching patterns. We have presented
some general suﬃcient conditions for monotone matching in these models.
These have an intuitive basis and appear to be reasonably straightforward
to apply. Speciﬁcally, if one wants to ensure PAM, it does not suﬃce only to
have complementarity in types of productivity; one must ensure as well that
there is enough complementarity of type and transferability.
To summarize, if one wants to check that equilibrium matching pattern
of an NTU model with continuous, decreasing Pareto frontiers is monotone:
• Check that the model satisﬁes GID for segregation/PAM, and GDD
for NAM.
• If this proves unworkable, try the diﬀerential conditions (or their lattice
theoretic counterparts).
• Take advantage of the ordinal nature of GID; perhaps a monotone
transformation of types’ payoﬀs is tractable enough that GID or the
diﬀerential conditions can be veriﬁed
• In particular, the model may have a TU representation, in which case
o n en e e do n l yc h e c kf o rI Do rD Do ft h ej o i n tp a y o ﬀ.
6.2 Discussion
This paper has focused on the study of properties of the economic environ-
ment that lead to monotone matching. Implicitly motivating this analysis is
the question of how changes in the environment inﬂuence changes in match-
ing. Space, not to mention the present state of knowledge, is too limited
to oﬀer a complete answer to this question here, but the comparison of TU
with NTU is no doubt an important ﬁrst step. Here we simply point out that
economy-wide changes to transferability may help to explain phenomena that
could be characterized as mass re-assignments of partners.
For instance, mergers and divestitures involve reassignments of say, up-
stream and downstream divisions of ﬁrms. Transferability between divisions
depends on the eﬃciency of credit markets, and that in turn depends on
interest rates— higher ones lead to an increase in agency costs, i.e. reductions
28in transferability, with the magnitude of the eﬀect dependent on characteris-
tics of individual ﬁrms such as liquidity position or productivity. A shock to
the interest rate then may lead to widespread reassignment of partnerships
between upstream and downstream divisions, i.e., a “wave” of corporate re-
organization (Legros-Newman, 1999).
Or consider the eﬀects of a policy like Title IX, which requires US schools
and universities receiving federal funding to spend equally on men’s and
women’s activities (athletic programs having garnered the most public at-
tention), or suﬀer penalties in the form of lost funding. If one models a
college as partnership between a male and female student-athlete, identi-
fying their types with the revenue-generating capacities of their respective
sports, the policy acts to transform a TU model into an NTU one, rather like
Example 1. Imposing Title IX would lead to a reshuﬄing of the types males
and females who match; the male wrestler (low revenue), formerly matched
to the female point guard (high revenue), will now match with, say, a female
rower, while the point guard now plays at a football school. There is evidence
that this sort of re-assignment has taken place: the oft-noted terminations
and contractions of some sports at some colleges are ameliorated by start-ups
and expansions at others.
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